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Plutarch’s Lives and the 
Critical Reader1
T.E. Duff
You yourself will judge (ἐπικρινεῖς αὐτός) these 
things from the narrative (Agis 2.9).
In several of his prologues, Plutarch makes explicit claims for the 
moral benefit to be derived from reading about the great men of the 
past (e.g., Aem. 1; Per. 1-2; Demetr. 1). It is therefore striking that 
the Parallel Lives contain very little explicit instruction on what to 
learn from reading about their subjects or how to behave as a result2. 
In this paper I shall attempt to explore the ways in which the text 
does or does not guide the audience’s response to the subjects of the 
Lives. I shall argue that the lack of explicit injunction is revealing 
about the kind of contract Plutarch envisages between author and reader 
and about the kind of readers Plutarch constructs for his Lives: not 
passive readers expecting instruction but active, engaged and critical 
readers – just the kind of reader Plutarch imagines for some of the 
texts in the Moralia3.
1 I am grateful to Luc Van der Stockt for his invitation to attend the conference 
which gave rise to this volume and to Geert Roskam for his patience.
2 The lack of direct injunction is noted by Pelling (1988b), 15-16, and (1995), 
especially 205-208 and 218-20 (= repr. [2002a], 237-39 and 247-49), an article which is 
still the starting point for any discussion of how moralism worked in Plutarch. Pelling 
distinguishes ‘protreptic’ moralism, which seeks to guide conduct, from ‘descriptive’ 
moralism, which is “more concerned to point truths about human behaviour and shared 
human experience” (1995, 208). He also distinguishes ‘expository’ and ‘exploratory’ 
moralism: the latter encourages the reader’s reflection on the human condition rather 
than offering direct guidance on conduct (1995, 218-20 = repr. [2002a], 247-49). See 
my summary and discussion in Duff (1999), 52-71; (2007/8), 4-7.
3 I have been particularly influenced by Stadter (2000), who argues for the Lives 
as ‘adult education’ (504), in which Plutarch expected readers to distinguish for them-
selves what was good and bad, and compare their own lives with what they read; 
and by Konstan (2004), who argues that Plutarch’s De aud. poet. advocates a critical, 
questioning style of reading. (See also Konstan [2006], on ancient reading practises 
more generally.) Other important studies on the moralism of the Lives are Martin 
(1995); Duff (1999); Stadter (1997), (2003/4).
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1. The road not taken
It might be worth starting by looking at some examples of what Plutarch 
tends not to do. Take this passage of Xenophon’s Hellenica. Xenophon 
has just described the extraordinary scenes of popular devotion as the 
Spartan commander Teleutias left Aegina in 389 BC. He continues:
γιγνώσκω μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐν τούτοις οὔτε δαπάνημα οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε μηχάνημα 
ἀξιόλογον οὐδὲν διηγοῦμαι· ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τόδε ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀνδρὶ 
ἐννοεῖν, τί ποτε ποιῶν ὁ Τελευτίας οὕτω διέθηκε τοὺς ἀρχομένους. τοῦτο 
γὰρ ἤδη πολλῶν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ κινδύνων ἀξιολογώτατον ἀνδρὸς ἔργον 
ἐστίν.
Now I am aware that I am not describing here anything which cost 
a lot of money or was very dangerous, or any memorable stratagem. 
But by Zeus, it seems to me well worth a man’s while to consider 
what sort of conduct it was that enabled Teleutias to inspire such 
feelings in the men he commanded. For this is the achievement of a 
real man, more worthy of note than large sums of money expended 
or dangers faced. (Hell. V, 1.4)
Here Xenophon not only makes an explicit narratorial statement, phrased 
in the first person (“I am aware . . . it seems to me”), and gives a clear 
moral judgement (“this is the achievement of a man . . .”) but also states 
explicitly what reaction the reader should have (“it seems to me well 
worth a man’s while to consider . . .”). Note, however, that, despite 
this explicitness, Xenophon stops short of actually spelling out what 
a reader should do as a result of thinking about Teleutias: the reader 
is not told explicitly to imitate that conduct, though that is certainly 
implied.
Xenophon slightly later makes another explicit statement of the 
lessons to be learned from Teleutias’ career. This time the lesson is a 
negative one, and concerns Teleutias’ death in battle: he had advanced 
too close to the walls of Olynthus in 381, and been killed, and his 
death had led to a general collapse of the army with great loss of life. 
Xenophon comments:
ἐκ μέντοι γε τῶν τοιούτων παθῶν [ὡς] ἐγώ φημι ἀνθρώπους παιδεύεσθαι 
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν <ὡς> οὐδ’ οἰκέτας χρὴ ὀργῇ κολάζειν· πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ 
δεσπόται ὀργιζόμενοι μείζω κακὰ ἔπαθον ἢ ἐποίησαν· ἀτὰρ ἀντιπάλοις τὸ 
μετ’ ὀργῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ γνώμῃ προσφέρεσθαι ὅλον ἁμάρτημα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ 
ἀπρονόητον, ἡ δὲ γνώμη σκοπεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον μή τι πάθῃ ἢ ὅπως βλάψῃ τι 
τοὺς πολεμίους.
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From such disasters I myself say that men are taught the lesson, in 
particular, that they ought not to punish even a slave in anger. For 
even masters when angry suffer more harm than they inflict. But to 
charge an enemy in anger and without thought is totally mistaken. 
For anger does not foresee, whereas thought considers no less how 
to avoid suffering harm as it does how to inflict it on the enemy. 
(Hell. V, 3.7)
Here we have once again an explicit moral judgement expressed in an 
emphatic first person (“I myself say”). But this time the practical appli-
cation of that judgement is stated more explicitly. And the application 
is expressed not only in terms of military leadership (the immediate 
context) but also in general terms, abstracted from the particular, military 
situation (not hitting even a slave in anger). That more general lesson 
is one that could be applied, one assumes, by many of Xenophon’s 
readers, even if they took no part in soldiering. This might give us a 
clue to how ancient readers were expected to abstract general, moral 
lessons from the particular details of statesmanship and war, and to 
apply them in the more mundane circumstances of their own lives.
2. Telling and showing
I mention these passages not to claim that such authorial interventions 
are common in Xenophon4, but rather to show the sort of thing that 
Plutarch could have done, had he wanted5. This makes all the more 
striking the rarity, in the body of the Lives, of explicit statements 
about what is right or wrong or attempts to guide the readers’ conduct 
explicitly. In order to understand both what Plutarch does and does 
not do, let us attempt to construct a typology of examples, arranged 
in what we might call a descending order of explicitness.
Very occasionally we do find apparently general, gnomic statements 
in the present tense about what ‘is’ right or wrong or how the world, 
usually the world of politics, works. Such general statements usually 
arise from description of a subject’s behaviour and imply a judgement 
on it. So, for example, in discussing the quarrel between Agesilaus and 
4 Though cf. also Hell. V, 4.1.
5 Compare also the famous passage in Nepos’ Eumenes, where a direct and explicit 
comparison is made between the indiscipline of Eumenes’ army and that of contem-
porary Roman armies: “And so there is danger that our soldiers may do what the 
Macedonians did, and ruin everything by their licence and lawlessness . . .” (8.2). See 
Pelling (1995), 208-209 (= repr. [2002a], 239-40).
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Lysander, Plutarch comments on the dangers which ‘ambitious natures’ 
can pose to their societies (Lys. 23.3; Ages. 8.4). This could have 
been converted to an injunction: “Keep your ambition within check; 
don’t let quarrels with others damage the community”. Plutarch himself 
makes this injunction directly in the Political Precepts (809B-810A). 
Indeed in that text Plutarch uses Agesilaus’ snubbing of Lysander as 
an exemplum of how young men at the start of their careers should 
not behave to their patrons (809F). But that is not how it is put in 
the Life: the connection between the historical data and the reader’s 
own response is left for the reader to draw out him- or herself 6. This 
is a point to which we shall return.
Similar are Plutarch’s comments on the behaviour of kings in Demetr. 
42.8-11, which begin “For nothing is so befitting for a king as the 
work of justice”. Plutarch goes on to cite in confirmation various 
statements from Homer and other poets which associate kingship or 
godhead with justice, before criticising Demetrius for priding himself 
rather on the name ‘Besieger’. The immediate reference is thus to 
Demetrius, but the present tense might encourage us to take this as a 
statement with more general reference7. Similar might be said of the 
comment at Demetr. 30, also phrased in the present tense, on how “the 
most worthless proof of goodwill in a mob towards kings and dynasts 
is the extravagant bestowal of honours”. But in both cases the sense 
of present-day applicability is muted; although kings and dynasts still 
existed in Plutarch’s day (Plutarch himself dedicates several works 
to Philopappus of Commagene), the days of the Hellenistic monar-
chies were over and talking here of kings8 rather than merely rulers 
6 Cf. Cor. 14.6, a disquisition on the ill effects of bribery at both Athens and 
Rome; and Pomp. 23.5-6, on the dangers facing a general in politics (discussed by 
Pelling [1995], 205-206 = repr. [2002a], 237). In both cases no explicit link to the 
reader’s own time is made.
7 The passage ends (42.11), “Thus evil having advanced to the place of good under 
the influence of ignorant power brought injustice into relation with glory” (συνῳκείωσε 
τῇ δόξῃ τὴν ἀδικίαν). The aorist tense might suggest that the immediate reference is 
to Demetrius and perhaps other Hellenistic kings, but it could equally be taken as a 
‘gnomic’ aorist, and so have a more general reference.
8 Some readers might possibly think here of Roman emperors, a connection made 
easier by the fact that βασιλεύς was, from near the end of Plutarch’s life, used of 
Roman emperors in informal contexts: Mason (1974), 120-21. But, though one of 
the characters in the Amatorius refers to Vespasian as ‘reigning’ (βασιλεύειν: 771C), 
Plutarch never refers to emperors as βασιλεῖς (see Jones [1966], 62 = repr. [1995], 
97-98] on De tranq. an. 467E). Cf. Arist. 6, where he criticises Hellenistic kings for 
making themselves gods. Scott (1929) argues that this would be taken as criticism of 
the imperial cult, but the most we can say is that some readers might have chosen 
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or those in authority would serve to distance most readers from the 
point being made9.
Besides such general moral statements, which use the behaviour 
of the subject as a jumping-off point for generalised reflection, we 
also occasionally find explicit statements of approval or disapproval 
which are directed more specifically to the behaviour of the subjects. 
For example, in describing Demetrius’ cavorting with whores on the 
Athenian acropolis, which Plutarch characterises with the loaded term 
hubris, Plutarch comments in a parenthesis that Demetrius ‘ought’ to 
have respected Athena (Demetr. 24.1)10. In Ant. 19.4, discussing the 
proscriptions of 43 BC, Plutarch comments, in a very rare example 
of a first-person verb, “I do not think anything could be crueller or 
more savage than this exchange”11. Similarly direct judgements are 
found in Dem. 22.4-7, where Plutarch explicitly condemns the actions 
of the Athenians in celebrating Philip’s death (“For my part, I could 
not say that it was good . . . for besides inviting nemesis it was also 
ignoble . . .”), and praises Demosthenes for rising above his private 
grief: “However, that Demosthenes left his domestic misfortunes . . . I 
praise [ἐπαινῶ], and I hold it to be the mark of a statesmanlike and 
manly spirit to . . .”. The passage concludes with general reflections, 
phrased as a rhetorical question, about how consolation from private 
griefs can be found in public service.
Such rare authorial comments, as well as guiding the audience, 
also serve to construct for Plutarch a particular authorial persona12. 
This is perhaps clearer in those cases where he defends rather than 
to read it like this: see Jones (1971), 123-24; Bowersock (1973), 187-91; Swain 
(1996), 182 n. 146.
 9 In general Plutarch seems to avoid in the Lives making obvious references to 
present-day institutions or recent history, leaving readers to make those connections 
for themselves. See Pelling (1995), 205-220 (= repr. [2002a], 243-47; (2002c). For a 
different view, see many of the papers in Stadter – Van der Stockt (2002), reviewed 
in Duff (2005).
10 Δημήτριος δέ, τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αὐτῷ προσῆκον εἰ δι᾿ ἄλλο μηδὲν ὥς γε πρεσβυτέραν ἀδελφὴν 
αἰσχύνεσθαι . . . For other such parentheses with προσῆκον, cf. Pomp. 67.4; Cleom. 5.2, 
16.3; Arat. 3.3. A more forthright example is Nic. 14.1-2: Nicias’ not being carried 
away in the enthusiasm for the Sicilian expedition “was the mark of a good and 
moderate (σώφρονος) man”; but once the expedition had been voted and Nicias put 
in command, “it was no longer the time” (οὐδεὶς ἔτι καιρὸς ἦν) for caution: he “ought” 
(ἔδει) to have attacked immediately.
11 Cf. Pelling (1988b), 149: in this part of the Ant. Plutarch’s “moral commentary 
is unusually direct, both in praise (14.4, 17.4-6) and in blame (15.5, 19.4, 20.4)”.
12 Pelling (1995), 207 (= repr. [2002a], 238); (2002b), 277-78. He cites as examples 
of such self-characterising judgements Ca. Ma. 5.6, Ages. 15.4, and Otho 2.1-2.
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attacks: Lysander “should not be blamed too much” for his craving 
for praise, as this was almost unavoidable for one brought up in the 
Spartan system (Lys. 2.4)13; Alcibiades’ forceful preventing of his wife 
from filing for divorce “was not thought lawless or inhumane”, since, 
in fact, Plutarch says, the law wanted husbands to have the chance 
to stop their wives (Alc. 8.6). In such passages Plutarch is presenting 
himself as (by contemporary mores) reasonable and humane, not quick 
to judge, as sympathetic to cultural nuance, but ready to condemn 
where necessary: just the way he presents himself in the prologue to 
the Cimon – Lucullus, where he famously claims that he will neither 
omit nor over-emphasise negative features of his subjects, “as though 
out of respect for human nature” (Cim. 2.3-5)14.
In all the cases we have mentioned so far narratorial intervention 
makes a very clear moral point, though the reader is not addressed 
directly and there is no attempt to convert the moral point into advice 
or injunction. However, a reader primed to think ‘morally’ could easily 
convert Plutarch’s comments into injunctions and see ways that those 
injunctions might be applicable to his or her own life. Not, of course, 
one assumes, that many readers would find themselves tempted to 
consort with ladies of ill-repute on the acropolis of Athens (or of any 
other polis); and few might be in a position to agree upon a list of 
political opponents to be murdered. But more widely applicable lessons 
could easily be abstracted from the specific historical situation. We 
saw Xenophon doing this explicitly for his readers when commenting 
on the dangers of anger as shown by Teleutias’ death. But we should 
note that the moral lesson in all these examples is so uncontroversial 
(‘don’t be unjust in authority’, ‘don’t commit sacrilege’, ‘don’t be 
faithless’, ‘don’t betray your friends’), that, as Pelling has emphasised, 
the authorial comment merely strengthens what one may assume to 
have been the reaction of most readers anyway15.
Such instances of direct judgemental comment on specific actions 
are, however, rare16. More common are passages of character-analysis 
13 On this passage, see Pelling (1988a), 268-74 (= repr. [2002a], 292-97); (1990), 
225, 232 (= repr. [2002a], 293, 312, plus postscript 324); Duff (1999), 177-80; Duff 
(2008a), 14.
14 On Cim. 2.3-5, see, e.g., Pelling (1995), 208 (= repr. [2002a], 239); Duff (1999), 
59-60.
15 Pelling (1995), 207 (= repr. [2002a], 238).
16 Much rarer than one might think. Aem. 13.2 and Ages. 23.6 both use δεινόν 
(‘terrible’) in a moral sense (though in each case the behaviour criticised is that of 
a character other than the subject of the Life: Perseus or Phoebidas). In most other 
cases where terms such as δεινόν or κακόν are used they represent the thoughts or 
words of characters within the text rather than authorial comments.
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(that is, where Plutarch describes or discusses a subject’s character 
directly). Here too a clear narratorial, moral position can be discerned. 
The link between character-analysis and morality or judgement rests 
on the fact that for Plutarch, as for ancient writers more generally, 
character was itself conceived of in essentially moral terms; character-
analysis thus often consists of an enumeration of virtues and vices17. 
Plutarch himself, in his famous statement at the start of the Alexander – 
Caesar, in which he declares a focus on material that will reveal char-
acter (ἦθος), glosses character in terms of “virtues and vices” (ἀρετῆς 
καὶ κακίας) (Alex. 1.2). Direct characterisation, then, usually implies a 
moral judgement and invites a moral reading, and Plutarch regularly 
uses the language of virtue and vice to describe what we might call 
character-traits18. Thus, for example, when Plutarch ascribes Camillus’ 
success in a bitterly divided Rome to his moderation (μετριότης) and 
shrewdness (φρόνησις) (Cam. 1.4), or states that Aemilius is said to have 
surpassed his contemporaries in “manliness, trustworthiness, and good 
faith” (Aem. 2.6), he invokes well-known virtues19. In such cases it 
would be clear to an ancient reader, steeped in the language of virtue 
and vice, praise and blame, that virtues are admirable and to be imitated 
and vices despicable and to be both deplored and avoided20. Plutarch 
himself makes that point in several prologues, though he never says 
so explicitly in the body of the Lives. That is a step the reader is left 
to make for him- or herself.
In such cases of direct characterisation, judgement on the subject’s 
moral character is stated as authoritative, narratorial comment and draws 
on a set of accepted and uncontroversial virtues and vices. A particu-
lar feature of the Lives, however, is that statements about a subject’s 
17 For the ancient tendency to conceive of character in moral terms, see Gill 
(1983); (1990); (1996a).
18 And conversely, where we might expect Plutarch to make a comment on an 
action, he often speaks in terms of character: so, when Perseus surrenders to the 
Romans Plutarch comments, “At that time he made it clear that his love of life was 
a more ignoble evil in him than his love of money” (Aem. 26.7).
19 Similarly, when Plutarch points out the similarities of character between Pericles 
and Fabius Maximus and points to their calmness and justice, and their ability to 
endure opposition, he labels such qualities ‘virtues’ (ἀρετάς) (Per. 2.5).
20 Though he tends to emphasise virtues rather than vices: see Martin (1995). Of 
course the moral implications of characterising statements may not always be obvi-
ous to the modern reader. This might be the case, for example, where Plutarch uses 
terms drawn from Platonic philosophy, such as when he invokes Plato’s distinction 
between reason (λόγος) or reasoning (λογισμός), spirit (θυμός), and passion or emotion 
(πάθος). On Plutarch’s deployment of such Platonic terms in the Lives, see, e.g., Duff 
(1999), ch. 3.
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character or judgements of his actions are sometimes fully or partly 
focalised through onlookers or minor characters: we are presented 
with the subject in action and with judgments on that action made by 
those who witness it, in what Pelling has called “characterisation by 
reaction”21. As a result of this technique, an interest in morality often 
seems to emerge directly out of the story rather than to be imposed 
on it from outside. Thus, when Alexander is pressing eastwards on 
horseback in pursuit of Bessus, Plutarch describes how he refused water 
offered to him, as there was not enough for his parched men to drink. 
Plutarch concludes, “When his cavalry saw his self-control and high-
mindedness (τὴν ἐγκράτειαν αὐτοῦ καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν), they began shouting 
out for him to lead them forward with confidence and they whipped 
on their horses, declaring that they did not regard themselves as tired 
or thirsty or even as mortal as long as they had such a king” (Alex. 
42.6-10). It is not wholly clear here to what extent the focalisation is 
to be taken as the narrator’s or merely that of Alexander’s men. But 
in fact there is no conflict: it is plain not only from the terms with 
which Alexander’s behaviour is described, but also because a general’s 
sharing in the hardships of his men was itself a stock virtue22, that 
the reader is expected to consider this a virtuous act. The reactions 
of a group of onlookers, like a chorus in a play, guide or model the 
reader’s reaction. And though this is not stated, most readers will feel 
confident that the narrator’s viewpoint coincides with that of such 
onlookers, and that they are expected to share both23.
In other cases, opposing reactions are given, though often with a 
strong hint at which should carry more weight. Thus, when Marius exer-
cises for war in the Campus Martius, despite being of great age, Plutarch 
comments “Some people were pleased to see him doing this, and they 
used to go down and watch his competitiveness and struggles. But the 
best people (τοῖς . . . βελτίστοις), when they saw him, were moved to pity 
at his greed and love of glory, because, although he had become very 
21 See Pelling (1988b), s.v. ‘characterisation by reaction’; (1992), 13 (= repr. 
[2002a], 119-20); Duff (1999), index of themes, s.v. ‘onlookers, as mouthpiece for 
author’.
22 See, e.g., Pelling (1988b), ad. Ant. 4.4-6 and 43.6. In the Caesar, the Life paired 
with the Alex., Plutarch makes the point about Caesar’s sharing the hardships of his 
troops explicitly (Caes. 17).
23 For another example, cf. Cic. 6.1: when Cicero takes up the quaestorship of Sicily 
in 75 BC, Plutarch declares, “When the Sicilians had experience of his carefulness, 
justice, and calmness [τῆς ἐπιμελείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πρᾳότητος αὐτοῦ], they honoured 
him more than they had ever honoured any other governor” (Cic. 6.1). The language 
chosen here invokes well-known and uncontroversial virtues, and readers will have 
felt confident that the narrator’s view coincides with that of the Sicilians.
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rich from being poor and very powerful from being powerless, he did 
not know how to set a bound to his good fortune” (Mar. 34.6). Similar 
is Ant. 9, where Antony’s behaviour in suppressing Dolabella causes 
the multitude to hate him, but the good and prudent (τοῖς . . . χρηστοῖς 
καὶ σώφροσι) are said to dislike not this but his general manner of life: 
“they loathed his ill-timed drunkenness, his heavy expenditures, his 
cavorting with women . . .” (Ant. 9.2); the passage continues with a list 
of Antony’s debaucheries, still presented as the thoughts of sensible 
observers24. As Antony’s behaviour is mapped onto an uncontrover-
sial set of stock vices, most readers would presumably identify with 
the good and prudent and share their disapproval. But such cases of 
multiple internal focalisations encourage the reader to enter into the 
act of judging the behaviour of the subjects themselves, even though 
the conclusion to which they are steered is never really in doubt25. 
They also, perhaps, serve to broaden the reader’s moral perspective. 
Although one interpretation is privileged, many readers might not feel 
that the other is wholly worthless: perhaps, a reader might muse, there 
was something mildly admirable about Marius’ exertions in old age, 
despite the fact that they revealed his inner discontent and greed, and 
perhaps Antony’s suppression of Dolabella was distasteful, even if it 
was necessary. We shall have more to say about the way the Lives 
encourage the reader to think in the next section.
Finally there are many cases in the Lives where the actions of the 
subject are described, whether as part of a continuous, chronologically 
organised narrative or of self-contained anecdotes, but there is no explicit 
reference to a virtue or vice, however focalised, and no reference to 
the opinions or judgements of onlookers. This accords the reader more 
autonomy. But even in these cases, readers alert to issues of morality, 
and used to what we might call a ‘judgemental’ approach to character 
and behaviour, will often have had no problem in reading such episodes 
in a moralising fashion. In Alex. 15, for example, Plutarch describes 
how, before crossing the Hellespont, Alexander distributed nearly all 
24 ἐλύπουν (‘grieved’) and δεινὸν . . . ἐποιοῦντο (‘they thought it terrible’) show that 
all this is still focalised through the sensible observers. On this passage, see Pelling 
(1988b), ad loc.
25 Similar might be said of some of those cases where the thoughts of the subject 
of the Life are given. When Coriolanus is described as “thinking that winning and 
beating everyone at all times was the mark of bravery, not of weakness and softness” 
(Cor. 15.5), or Pyrrhus as “thinking that it was sickeningly boring not to do evil to 
others or have it done to him by them” (Pyrrh. 13.2), it is clear both from the con-
text of the Life as a whole, and from the way in which these views, common though 
they must have been amongst many of Plutarch’s contemporaries, flatly contradict 
philosophical values, that the reader is expected to reject their reasonings.
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the royal lands or revenues to his companions, though some, such as 
Perdiccas, refused to accept them; Plutarch quotes the latter’s declara-
tion that he would rather share Alexander’s hopes for the future. It 
is clear that one of the points of this story is to indicate Alexander’s 
generosity to his friends, a stock virtue in kings, and the way it won 
their devotion in return, as well as his single-minded ambition. Indeed 
anecdotes in Plutarch, and in ancient literature in general, tend to func-
tion in this way: that is, they tend to suggest, illustrate, confirm or 
amplify character traits. So it would be natural for an ancient reader 
to read such stories with an eye to the moral import – that is, to see 
them as having at their heart, as Plutarch puts it, “the revelation of 
virtue and vice” (Alex. 1.2)26. We might make similar comments about 
Plutarch’s words in Phoc. 7 on Phocion’s behaviour to Chabrias, the 
man who had promoted and supported him as a young man. While 
Chabrias was alive, Plutarch says, Phocion continued to honour and 
pay him respect, and after his death he took care of Chabrias’ relatives, 
especially his wayward son, who caused him considerable trouble. Few 
ancient readers would have failed to see this as admirable behaviour 
towards a patron. Conversely, when Plutarch talks of the slaughter 
which Sulla wrought on Athens, so great that the blood stains were 
visible two hundred years later (Sull. 14.5-7), or of the money- grubbing 
of Themistocles (Them. 5.1-2), few readers will have failed to see 
both as reprehensible. But Plutarch does not say so, and leaves to 
the reader the work both of extracting the general moral from the 
particular incident and of considering how, if at all, that lesson might 
be relevant or applicable in their own lives27.
3. Multivalence
In the Lives, then, Plutarch tends not to ‘tell’ the readers the moral les-
sons they should learn from any given incident or Life. Still less does 
he tell them how to apply such lessons in their own circumstances. 
He can work in this understated, implicit way because he relies on his 
readers’ possessing both a mentality of moralism in general (that is, a 
‘judgemental’ attitude to human behaviour in both present and past) 
and a common set of notions about what made virtuous or vicious 
behaviour, a common repertoire of virtues and vices. It is, neverthe-
less, the reader who does the work of abstracting notions of virtue 
26 See, e.g., Stadter (1996).
27 Stadter (2003/4), 91-94 is particularly good on how “Plutarch relies on his 
readers to be able to distinguish what is admirable from what not in a Life” (91). 
See also idem (2000), 500-505.
Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics  -  ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4  -  Leuven University Press
 plutarch’s LIVES and the critical reader 69
and vice from the specific particular events or actions narrated and 
of translating all this into application in their own lives. It is this 
notion of an engaged and critical reader that I wish to emphasise in 
the second half of this paper.
In all the cases we have dealt with so far, the ‘moral’ has been 
fairly clear, even if it has not been stated explicitly or any guidance 
given as to practical application. However, not all incidents, or all 
Lives, can have been seen as having such a clear-cut moral or as so 
easy to evaluate. Indeed, that last story, of Phocion doing his best to 
keep his patron’s son on the straight-and-narrow after the latter’s death, 
contains a disturbing element – or rather, an element that enriches and 
deepens the meaning that a reader might extract from it, while com-
plicating any attempt to convert it into a simple injunction. Phocion, 
Plutarch says, recognised that Chabrias’ son was unstable and difficult 
to lead (ἔμπληκτον . . . καὶ ἀνάγωγον) but persisted in trying to correct him. 
However, Plutarch continues, the young man caused him a great deal of 
trouble, and was particularly annoying on campaign, causing Phocion 
to cry out that he was paying Chabrias back generously “in enduring 
his son” (7.4). To a reader who already knows of Phocion’s fate, or 
who looks back to this story after reading on, Phocion’s trouble with 
Chabrias’ son prefigures the very difficulties which Phocion would have 
with the demos (e.g. Phoc. 9; 24), which he also tried to straighten 
out; insubordination on campaign and in military matters was a par-
ticular problem (12.3; cf., e.g., 9.3-7; 24.1-5). Readers who call to 
mind Phocion’s death at the hands of an ungrateful demos (chs. 31-38) 
may have seen his insistence on trying to take Chabrias’ son in hand, 
admirable though it will still have seemed, in a more complex light. 
Or to put in another way, Phocion’s relationship with Chabrias’ son, 
just like his relationship with the people, will have provided a tricky 
moral problem or crux, made all the more poignant by Phocion’s own 
evident failure to reform his own sons (Phoc. 20, 30, 38)28.
Many Plutarchan anecdotes are as rich and multivalent as this story, 
especially when – as we have done for this one – they are read against 
the background of the whole Life of which they form part. Take the story 
of Alexander’s out-of-season visit to Delphi (Alex. 14.6-7). When the 
priestess refuses to see him, Alexander tries to drag her to the temple. 
As with the Phocion anecdote, and as often with ancient anecdotes 
generally, the main point comes in a punch-line given in direct speech 
and forming the end of the anecdote. Here, the priestess exclaims, as 
28 Plutarch could, of course, have avoided the moral complexity suggested here, 
had he wanted: he might, for example, have avoided ending the story with Phocion’s 
cry of woe, or removed the reference to trouble on campaign.
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she is manhandled, “You are invincible, my son!”. The anecdote thus 
points forward to Alexander’s victories, though it is left unclear whether 
the priestess’s words are to be taken as having some supernatural force 
(do they predict his greatness, or somehow bring it about?) or whether 
they merely provide a revealing comment on Alexander’s character, 
and in so doing explain his successes. Her words also serve to char-
acterise Alexander by bringing out his decisiveness and his refusal to 
take no for an answer29. But would all readers have seen the anecdote 
as redounding so simply to Alexander’s credit? This incident, placed 
shortly after the narration of the sack of Thebes (Alex. 11-13), might 
suggest also a violent character, and a disregard for the gods30; it might 
bring to mind not only his later violence to both enemies and friends 
but also his demands to be treated as a god. Similar might be said 
of the later episode at Gordion, where Alexander, with similar violent 
decisiveness, cuts through the famous knot with his sword and takes 
upon himself the prophecy that he would become lord of Asia. To 
reduce anecdotes like these either to a simple, univocal message about 
Alexander’s character, let alone to an injunction to the reader (“don’t 
take no for an answer”, perhaps?) would be to miss their wealth of 
significance and their potentially disturbing or destabilising aspects.
Another example of such multivalence is provided by the story 
of the conversation of Antony and his lieutenant Canidius shortly 
before the Battle of Actium (Ant. 63). Canidius urges Antony to send 
Cleopatra away, withdraw eastwards and fight it out on land. “For in 
fact”, Plutarch continues, apparently summarising Canidius’ arguments, 
“Diocomes the king of the Getae was promising to come to their aid 
with a large army, and he said it was no disgrace to give up the sea, 
as Caesar had practised himself there in the Sicilian war . . .”.31 Good 
advice, we might think, which Antony should have heeded. But several 
factors might give us pause. Canidius is said to have changed his mind 
“in the face of danger” (παρὰ τὰ δεινά), which seems to suggest that 
his change of heart might have been made under the grip of emotion 
29 The anecdote and the priestess’s words recall the anecdote of the taming of 
Bucephalas, which had concluded with Alexander’s father telling him, “Seek a kingdom 
which is your equal; Macedonia is too small for you” (6.8) – a similarly characterising 
statement, with some predictive force. On the characterising function of Plutarchan 
anecdotes, see Stadter (1996), including 291-94 on the Bucephalas incident. On anec-
dotes ‘foreshadowing’ later themes, see Duff (2003) and (2008b).
30 Indeed, in Alex. 13.3-4 Alexander himself links the sack of Thebes and his later 
misdeeds with “the wrath and nemesis of Dionysus”.
31 The first part of this sentence (καὶ γάρ . . .) could be taken as Plutarch’s narrato-
rial explanation or parenthesis. But context seems to imply that it is to be taken as 
summarising Canidius’ words.
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or fear32. Furthermore, the claim that the Getae (Thracian or Dacian 
tribes) would come to Antony’s aid, or that this would make much 
difference, must be considered doubtful at best33. Thus it is not entirely 
clear that the reader should, after all, side with Canidius. But this is 
presumably at least part of the point. Plutarch could have closed off 
any doubt by making an authorial pronouncement about what the true 
situation was and what Antony should have done; but by presenting the 
case for retreat in such a weak way, and by hinting that it may have 
been motivated by panic or fear rather than strict reasoning, Plutarch 
instead draws the reader into the dilemma faced by Antony: to stand 
and fight bravely or to risk accusations of cowardice by casting his 
hopes on an uncertain future?
We noticed earlier how Plutarch often focalises the characterisation 
of the subject of a Life through the thoughts or comments of groups 
such as the people or onlookers. In those earlier examples the reader 
seems to have been expected to share the judgements of such onlook-
ers or, where divergent reactions are presented, is given a strong push 
as to whom they should side with – though, as we noted, even there, 
divergent focalisation tends to have the effect of exposing the reader to 
different perspectives, even if one is obviously to be preferred. But in 
some cases in Plutarch it is not at all clear whether judgements made by 
minor characters in the Life are to be shared by the reader or which of 
two divergent points of view should be adopted. In Alc. 16, for example 
Plutarch gives the thoughts of “the reputable men” (οἱ ἔνδοξοι), as they 
looked on Alcibiades’ outrageous behaviour: “alongside their loathing 
and indignation, they were afraid at his contemptuousness and lawless-
ness, thinking these things were tyrannical and monstrous” (16.2). The 
demos, however, Plutarch continues, combined enthusiastic love and 
hate for Alcibiades, and forgave all his misdeeds (16.3-5). One might 
be tempted at first reading to think that the reader should follow the 
lead of the reputable onlookers and simply condemn Alcibiades (“We 
don’t react like the fickle demos . . .”). But such a straight-forwardly 
negative reaction would go against the tenor of the Life so far, which 
has stressed Alcibiades’ good nature as well as his flaws; indeed, proof 
of his good nature was provided, Plutarch says, by Socrates’ attachment 
for him (Alc. 4.1; 6.1). Furthermore, Plutarch’s source here, Thucydides, 
32 Other occurrences of παρὰ τὰ δεινά refer to people who show courage or disci-
pline or keep their cool and act rationally “in the face of danger”, e.g., Aem. 12.2, 
24.8; Sert. 10.2; Eum. 16.10; Dion 42.3; Brut. 49.7; Comp. Pel. et Marc. 3.6; De ad. 
et am. 69A; Reg. et imp. apophth. 172F; De Al. Magn. fort. 333C.
33 Pelling (1988b) comments ad loc. that “P. phrases Canidius’ arguments power-
fully and presumably intends them to carry conviction”, but, notes that, in referring 
to the Getae, “Canidius was clutching at straws”.
Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics  -  ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4  -  Leuven University Press
72 t.e. duff
has all the Athenians fearing Alcibiades; Plutarch has thus chosen to 
introduce a split-focalisation and with it an element of uncertainty34. 
Finally, Plutarch himself will later distinguish objective reality from 
the viewpoint of the leading citizens on exactly the point made here: 
Alcibiades’ tyrannical ambitions. They feared after his return from exile 
that he wanted to make himself tyrant, but, declares Plutarch, “what 
attitude he himself had concerning tyranny is unclear” (35.1). Plutarch 
thus avoids guiding the reader about how to evaluate Alcibiades. But 
that is presumably the point: the reader is faced with the same difficulty 
which faced the Athenians. And in considering that problem, the engaged 
reader will think about what exactly makes a good leader, what are the 
temptations and dangers offered to the man who embraces the demos, 
to what extent crises demand leaders who might in normal times be 
considered distasteful or dangerous35.
4. Compare and contrast
This need for the reader’s active involvement in weighing-up competing 
alternatives or priorities is in fact reinforced by the distinctive, paired 
structure of the Parallel Lives. Readers only ever approach a single Life 
as part of a book, alongside another Life coupled with it. The juxtapo-
sition of two Lives makes differences between them particularly clear, 
and this double presentation encourages the readers’ critical involve-
ment, as they look at two men similar enough to be comparable, but 
different in both character and in the environment, culture and period 
in which they lived. Seeing the two men side by side encourages the 
reader to examine their different moral choices, the different ways they 
acted in the same situation or the way in which different circumstances 
brought the same actions to very different results36.
Some paired Lives, for example, when read syncritically, seem to 
highlight ways in which different sorts of morality might conflict. Take 
the Phocion – Cato, which provides two contrasting examples of how a 
statesman might react when faced with the inevitability of the imposition 
of autocracy on his state. Cato’s philosophical commitment to principle 
at all costs seems to be presented as virtuous and admirable, though 
34 See Pelling (1992), 22-24 (= repr. [2002a], 127-28).
35 Cf. Pelling’s ‘exploratory’ moralism (see n. 2). On Plutarch’s Alcibiades as 
thought-provoking, Duff (1999), 229-40.
36 See especially the illuminating analysis of Stadter (2000), 507-509; (2003/4), 
94. Stadter helpfully compares Plutarchan synkrisis to the projection of two pictures 
side by side in an art history class: “The system of pairs thus increases the readers’ 
ability to recognize and differentiate virtues in their different manifestations . . .” (2000, 
508). Cf. Plutarch’s own defence of synkrisis in Mul. virt. 243B-D.
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even from the start several less attractive features seem to undermine 
this very positive presentation, suggesting that he was extreme and 
over-rigid. Furthermore, while many of Cato’s actions, taken one by 
one, seem virtuous and praiseworthy, his life as a whole seems less so. 
This applies even more if one looks at the results of his life within the 
context of the particular society in which he lived and the particular 
problems he faced. Indeed, the prologue to the Phocion – Cato invites 
the reader to think of this very thing: Plutarch quotes Cicero’s dictum 
on Cato “acting as though he was a politician in Plato’s Republic not 
among the dregs of Romulus” and declares that, like fruit that appears 
out of season, “Cato’s old-fashioned nature, which came along after 
many years among corrupt lives and debased habits, had great glory 
and fame, but did not fit what was necessary because of the weight 
and size of his virtue, which were out of proportion to the immediate 
times” (Phoc. 3.2-3)37. Right from the prologue, then, we are encour-
aged to wonder whether Cato’s virtue was not unsuited to the realities 
of political life in the late Republic. Might not Phocion’s willingness 
to compromise his private principles for the common good, the reader 
is invited to ponder, have been the better course? But Phocion has no 
monopoly on virtue or political good-sense; he ended up murdered 
by the demos which he had spent his life trying to guide and curb. 
At any rate, by juxtaposing these two Lives, Plutarch invites the alert 
reader to engage in the job of weighing up their contrasting political 
choices38.
Not only do paired Lives present competing interpretations of the 
same periods or individuals, but the collection as a whole offers multiple 
presentations of the same periods from very different angles. Thus the 
Phocion (paired with the Cato the Younger) and the Demosthenes (paired 
with the Cicero) present Athens’ response to the threat of Macedon from 
two very different viewpoints; at the risk of simplifying excessively, in 
the Phocion the sympathy is with those who argued for compromise 
and quiescence, in the Demosthenes for those who resisted Macedonia 
to the end. In the Phocion, the demos appears unstable and dangerous; 
in the Demosthenes the demos receives a much more positive portrayal. 
Similarly, the Pelopidas portrays the events of the 370’s and 360’s BC 
from a Theban point of view, whereas the Agesilaus portrays them from 
a Spartan one. The Philopoemen presents the viewpoint of those who 
37 For analysis of the prologue of the Phocion – Cato, see Duff (1999), 137-41.
38 See Duff (1999), 131-60. There is no synkrisis to the Phocion – Cato to provide 
any kind of final judgement. On this pair of Lives, see also Trapp (1999); Zadorojnyi 
(2007). Similar questions are raised by the Lysander – Sulla: see Duff (1999), 161-204; 
also Stadter (1992a); (2003/4), 91-94.
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resisted Roman domination of Greece, the Flamininus (paired with 
the Philopoemen) those who brought that conquest. In fact, the whole 
collection of Parallel Lives can be regarded as a fabric of overlapping 
narratives, each presenting history from a slightly different angle: the 
late Republican Lives of Lucullus, Cicero, Pompey, Crassus, Cato the 
Younger, Caesar, Brutus and Mark Antony all cover roughly the same 
ground, but each gives slightly different emphases and each focalises the 
narrative through a different figure39; similarly with, e.g., Themistocles 
and Aristides, or Nicias and Alcibiades. The notion that the Lives give 
us a series of overlapping narratives, distinguished by their differing 
focalisations, takes us back to the point we made earlier about the 
tendency within individual Lives for some of the moral judgements to 
be focalised through observers rather than stated as authorial comment. 
In all cases, a discerning, critical reader is presupposed.
This sense of the reader as judge is particularly strong in the formal 
synkriseis which follow most pairs of Lives. One might expect the 
synkriseis to provide resolution, to offer a final authoritative judgment, 
to tell the readers how to judge the two men. There is certainly a good 
deal of ‘telling’: for example, Pompey, it is declared, came to power 
justly, whereas Agesilaus gained the throne “by sinning against gods 
and men” (Comp. Ages. et Pomp. 1.2); Pompey, however, helped his 
country only when it suited him, whereas Agesilaus abandoned his 
expedition in Asia and returned home when his country called him 
(Comp. Ages. et Pomp. 2.5-6). But that last example might give us 
pause: did not Pompey disband his army when he returned to Italy 
in 61 BC (Pomp. 43.1-5) – an act which might have been judged as 
equally selfless as Agesilaus’ return from Asia? In fact, this sense of 
the provisionality of the judgements made in the synkriseis, that they 
could have been done differently, seems to be central to them. The 
synkriseis do not provide a reasoned, authorial ‘conclusion’ on the Lives 
of the two men just narrated; rather they are rhetorical tours de force, 
attempts to argue a series of cases, or to show how they might be 
argued, on behalf of each of the men. Indeed, a few synkriseis divide 
neatly into two contrasting sections, each arguing the case of one of the 
subjects in turn. Furthermore, both the presentation of events and the 
judgements made in the synkrisis can sometimes be radically different 
from that implied in their two Lives. This ‘closural dissonance’, which 
is a notable feature of several synkriseis, has the effect of presenting 
the reader with two distinct views of the past, and with two distinct 
39 See Pelling (1979), which argues that the last six in this list were worked on 
simultaneously; (1980), on the differences between them; Beneker (2005), which argues 
that Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus were designed to be read together.
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ways of evaluating the subjects of the two Lives which have preceded, 
which the reader is left to evaluate40.
In most synkriseis, furthermore, there is no resolution, no final 
decision about which man should be considered more admirable, or 
which of their virtues should be imitated. Of those five synkriseis 
which do conclude with a closing judgement, four invite the reader 
to judge for themselves whether they agree or disagree. For example, 
the synkrisis to the Agis/Cleomenes – Gracchi ends: “You yourself can 
see [συνορᾷς μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτός] the difference [between them] from what 
has been said. But if it is necessary to set forth a decision about each 
one, I vote [τίθημι]41 that Tiberius was first of all of them in virtue . . .” 
(Comp. Ag., Cleom. et Gracch. 5.7)42. These cases make explicit what 
is implicit in the other synkriseis, that is, the invitation to the reader 
to participate in the act of judging. In all cases the point is not that 
readers come down in favour of one man or the other but that, by 
thinking for themselves and weighing the two men against each other, 
they gain greater insights into both and become practised in the art 
of moral thought. Similar can be said for the one case of a synkrisis 
which ends with a strident closing judgement without any hedging or 
address to the reader, the Coriolanus – Alcibiades. Here the synkrisis 
argues consistently for the superiority of Alcibiades, a judgement which 
seems not inconsistent with the two Lives themselves. But the final lines 
contain an unexpected reversal: “These are the things about which one 
might accuse the man [Coriolanus]. But all the rest are brilliant. For 
temperance and financial self-control it is right to compare him with 
the best and purest of the Greeks, not with Alcibiades, who, by Zeus, 
became in these matters the most audacious of men and who most 
despised what is good” (Comp. Cor. et Alc. 5.2). The very inconsistency 
of this judgement compared with what went before invites the readers 
to play their own parts in assessing the two men43.
40 Duff (1999), 252-86. On the Comp. Ages. et Pomp.: ibid. 275-78.
41 τίθημι sc. ψῆφον or γνώμην (LSJ A II 5), a court-room metaphor: cf. Comp. Thes. 
et Rom. 3.3 (ψήφους); Comp. Cim. et Luc. 3.6 (ψῆφον). 
42 Other examples: Comp. Cim. et Luc. 3.6: “The result is that for someone who 
takes everything into consideration, the judgement is hard to make [δυσδιαίτητον εἶναι 
τὴν κρίσιν] . . .”; Comp. Phil. et Flam. 3.5: “After this examination”, Plutarch tells 
us, “since the difference is hard to define [δυσθεώρητος], consider [σκόπει] whether 
we shall not be fair arbitrators if we award the Greek the crown for military skill 
and generalship . . .”; Comp. Lys. et Sull. 5.6: “It is time to consider [ὥρα δὴ σκοπεῖν] 
whether we shall not miss the truth by much if we declare that Sulla succeeded more 
but Lysander sinned less . . .”
43 Duff (1999), 203-204, 268-69, 282-83. Pelling (2002b), 274-75 also stresses 
the tentativeness of most closing judgements and the way they suggest collaboration 
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5. The critical reader in the Moralia
One might argue that talking of critical, sophisticated readers is merely 
to mount a rather desperate defence of, or to try to put as good a face 
as possible on, passages or texts which might otherwise seem confusing 
and inconsistent44. Is there any other evidence that Plutarch expected 
the kind of sophisticated readers whom we have imagined or indeed 
that ancient texts were ever read in this way?
First, the prologues to several pairs of Lives refer to or invite the 
reader’s active participation. The prologue to the Aemilius – Timoleon 
presents history as a mirror in which Plutarch, and by implications his 
reader, “adorns” his life and attempts “to make it like their virtues” (Aem. 
1.1): the image of the mirror suggests a complex process of observation, 
comparison and self-criticism45. At the start of the Demetrius – Antony 
Plutarch argues that discrimination or, as he puts it, “the power to 
make distinctions” (τὴν περὶ τὰς κρίσεις . . . δύναμιν, Demetr. 1.1), is what 
marks out our rational capacity; the senses, Plutarch argues, must pas-
sively receive all stimuli, but we can direct our minds where we will. 
It is this power of discrimination, he continues, which enables us to 
benefit from examples of bad conduct as much as good, as we can 
judge the correct response to each (1.1-5). In making this argument 
Plutarch sets up a contrast between casual readers, who read merely 
for pleasure, and serious readers who self-consciously choose material 
that will benefit them, and are able to distinguish what behaviour to 
avoid and what to imitate46. The prologue to the Pericles – Fabius 
makes a similar point about our ability to focus attention on what we 
choose, claiming that the object of our attention should be virtuous 
deeds, from which we may learn morally. Towards the end of that 
between ‘narrator’ and ‘narratee’. He also notes (ibid. 269-70) that the narrator’s 
presence, and that of the narratee, is felt more keenly in the synkrisis, as it is also 
in the prologues, than in the Lives themselves. His n. 8 lists first-person verbs and 
pronouns in the synkriseis, to which may be added Comp. Thes. et Rom. 1.6; Comp. 
Lyc. et Num. 1.4, 2.6, 3.6; Comp. Sol. et Publ. 1.3, 4.1; Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma. 3.3; 
Comp. Per. et Fab. 1.1; Comp. Nic. et Crass. 2.3; Comp. Dem. et Cic. 1.2; Comp. 
Phil. et Flam. 3.5; Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.8; Comp. Ag., Cleom. et Gracch. 5.7; Comp. 
Lys. et Sull. 5.1, 5.6.
44 A criticism made (very politely) by Brenk (2002), 455.
45 Stadter (2000), 500-505; (2003/4), 89-91. Stadter compares how in On lack of 
anger the speaker Fundanus describes how looking at the ill effects of anger in others 
encouraged him to control his own (e.g., 455E-456B). For further analysis of Aem. 1 
and the mirror image, see Duff (1999), 32-34.
46 On the Demetr. – Ant. prologue, see Duff (2004). Other prologues also distin-
guish ideal from less than ideal readers: Nic. 1.1; Alex. 1.1-3. See Pelling (2002b), 
275-76.
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prologue Plutarch talks of how the study of the virtuous deeds of the 
past “forms the spectator’s character not through imitation but through 
the investigation of the deed [τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τοῦ ἔργου]”. What Plutarch calls 
ἱστορία here probably refers both to the author’s research and narra-
tive and to the reader’s own thoughtful analysis and reflection47. This 
sense of the reader’s active involvement in a mutual investigation, in 
which he or she does the work of assessing and judging the moral 
character of the subjects and responds actively to the text through 
which these subjects are presented, recurs in the very final words of 
that prologue. After running through briefly some of the similarities 
in character between Pericles and Fabius, Plutarch concludes by invit-
ing the reader’s own participation: “But whether we aim correctly at 
what we should it is possible [sc. for you] to judge [κρίνειν] from my 
account” (Per. 2.5). Several other prologues end with an explicit or 
implied invitation to the reader to play an active part in assessing the 
Lives of the two men which follow48.
This sense of the reader’s own active engagement with, and inter-
rogation of, the text seems to be consistent with ancient pedagogical 
methods and reading practices. Students studied texts in the classroom 
by answering a series of questions put to them by their teacher. This 
approach seems, as David Konstan has suggested, to have influenced 
ancient techniques of reading more generally; the scholia and the ancient 
commentators preserve traces of such reading practices, which involve 
posing questions and answering them. As Konstan puts it, “Young 
people . . . were trained to look for conundrums and seek for solutions, 
whether in works of philosophy or literature”49. Furthermore, ancient 
critics recognised the effectiveness of leaving some things unsaid which 
the reader must infer for themselves. The treatise On Style ascribed to 
Demetrius cites Theophrastus for the view that “It is not necessary to 
go through everything in great detail; one should leave some things 
47 On the prologue to the Per. – Fab., and on the interpretation of this sentence, 
see Duff (1999), 34-45.
48 E.g., “You yourself will judge [ἐπικρινεῖς αὐτός] these things from the narrative” 
(Agis 2.9), which is picked up in the Comp. Ag., Cleom. et Gracch. 5.7 (quoted 
above); “We pass over perhaps some additional similarities, but it will not be difficult 
to collect them from the narrative itself ” (Cim. 3.3); “. . . it would be difficult to judge 
whether nature made them more alike in their manners or fortune in the facts of their 
lives” (Dem. 3.5); “they will make it a matter of dispute [διαμφισβήτησιν] whether the 
greatest of their successes were a result of their good fortune or their good sense” 
(Aem. 1.6).
49 Konstan (2006), on which this paragraph is wholly dependent. The quotation 
is from p. 12. On ancient reading practices, Konstan cites especially Cribiore (2001) 
and Nünlist (2009).
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out for the reader to understand and reason for himself. For when he 
understands what has been left out by you, he will be not only your 
audience but also your witness, and at the same time better disposed 
for you. For he will think himself intelligent because of the opportunity 
for exercising his intelligence which you have given him . . .”50.
Furthermore, many ancient readers will have been familiar with 
texts which present them with conflicting positions or arguments that 
demanded the reader to make a judgement: agones in tragedy, for 
example, or paired speeches in history, the dialogue form in philoso-
phy, or that staple of Greek rhetorical education, the declamation51. 
Declamations often took key moments in history, or counter-factuals 
drawn from history, and presented the reader with knotty problems or 
dilemmas. For example, the fourth-century AD orator Sopater suggests 
topics such as, “A prize is available for the best generals, and Eurybiades 
and Themistocles dispute it” (5.92.28 Walz) or “The enemy put up a 
statue of Pericles, and he is tried for treachery” (5.55.2). Declamations 
cast audiences as judges of the speeches given before them, often in 
pairs arguing opposing cases, which they were expected to weigh criti-
cally. One of the most ambitious sets of such declamations is Aelius 
Aristides’ second-century AD ‘Leuctrian’ orations: not two, but five 
speeches, imagined as delivered in the Athenian assembly in 370 BC, 
in which the first and third argue in favour of Athens’ allying with 
Sparta against Thebes, the second and fourth in favour of her allying 
with Thebes against Sparta, and the fifth in favour of neutrality (Or. 
11-15)52. The audience here plays the part of the assembly, which after 
listening to the speeches, will, in this sophisticated role-play, decide 
the issue.
Plutarch’s own extant works include several texts which contain 
paired speeches, each arguing opposite cases. In Which are cleverer: 
land animals or sea animals a debate is staged in which the case for 
each side is put in turn. The two speeches are framed by a dialogue, 
and the closing comment makes clear that neither speech is to be 
seen as superior but that, taken together, they prove the more general 
point, directed against the Stoics, that animals as a whole do possess 
reason: “For when you combine what you have just said against each 
other, you will both be able to struggle well together against those 
50 On Style 222 = Theophrastus fr. 696 Fortenbaugh. I owe my knowledge of this 
passage to Konstan (2006), 13-14.
51 Duff (1999), 244; Konstan (2006), 13-16. See also Yunis (2003), 201-204, on 
the way Thucydidean speeches invite the reader’s critical involvement, and 204-12 on 
the way in which Plato “portray[s] critical reading vividly in the text” (p. 211).
52 On Greek declamation, see Russell (1983), esp. 4-5. For a catalogue of themes 
of historical declamations, see Kohl (1915).
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who deprive animals of reason and intelligence” (985C). The frame 
is important in making clear how the whole is expected to work: the 
reader is presented with an unresolved conflict between opposing argu-
ments, but the result is to reinforce a notion common to both. This 
provides a good indication of the purpose of the unresolved questions 
in the Lives or their synkriseis: the reader’s moral sensibilities are 
deepened by being exposed to conflicting viewpoints and drawn into 
the work of assessing or resolving them. But the broader context of 
moral thought is never in doubt53.
Several other Plutarchan works cast the audience as judges by tak-
ing up one side of an argument and leaving the other to be inferred. 
Take the On the fortune or virtue of Alexander. The positions adopted 
here are extreme: Alexander owed his success, it is argued, to virtue 
alone and not luck; indeed he was supremely unlucky. And Alexander 
was not merely a brilliant general, it is claimed, but a philosopher, 
who educated as well as conquered: indeed he was a more successful 
philosopher than Plato and others. All of this might seem weak and 
forced; indeed, this work has generally been seen as so one-sided 
that it is assumed to be the product of an immature mind, and so 
assigned to Plutarch’s juvenilia. But to make such a judgement is to 
miss the way in which such texts work, the way they invite the reader 
to take part, to have in mind the opposite argument. The De Al. Magn. 
fort. is surely not intended to be taken as a reasoned statement of 
Plutarch’s own views, but as a rhetorical tour de force, demonstrating 
how one might make the case, and do it well, for this extreme posi-
tion. That we are meant to have in our minds the opposing position, 
or the possibility of an opposing position, is made clear in the opening 
words, which refer to a speech made on behalf of fortune or perhaps 
put into fortune’s mouth: “This is the speech of fortune, who claims 
Alexander as her own unique handiwork. But some answer must be made 
on behalf of philosophy, or rather on Alexander’s behalf . . .” (326D; 
cf. 340E). The position of the reader is once again as a judge of the 
arguments presented: not passive, but actively engaging with and weigh-
ing the arguments. Similar could be said of the Were the Athenians 
more glorious in war or in wisdom?. This treatise argues the surpris-
ing case that Athenian military successes were more important than 
53 See Duff (1999), 245-48 for more examples of texts in the Moralia which pres-
ent opposing arguments or deliberately one-sided positions as a means of encouraging 
reflection, and for the possibility that Plutarch’s name may have been associated by 
Favorinus with just this kind of argumentation. See also Swain (1992b), 104-106.
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their artistic or literary achievements. Few readers can have read this 
without considering in their own minds the opposite case54.
Finally, in his How the young man should listen to poems Plutarch 
himself argues for the kind of active reader which we have imagined55. 
In this text, Plutarch accepts that there is much in poetry that may be 
harmful to the young reader but does not counsel that poetry should 
be kept from the young, just as Plato had wished to expel poetry from 
his ideal state. Instead, he advises that the young should be taught to 
read carefully and critically. They should recognise that not everything 
the poet says is true (16A-17F), and that the poet’s representing of bad 
behaviour does not imply that he approves of it (17F-18F). When they 
come across bad behaviour, they should pay attention to the ‘hints’ 
(ἐμφάσεις) that the poet gives as to its correct evaluation (19A). They 
should look for contradictions (20C-21D) and consider what they read 
in the light of the words of the philosophers (21D-22A). They should 
realise that heroes or gods do not always do the right thing, and be 
ready to recognise when they do not (25E ff ). “One should be habitu-
ated”, Plutarch advises, “to shouting out boldly ‘wrong’ and ‘badly 
done’ as much as ‘right’ and ‘well done’” (26B).
The young reader, furthermore, should be made aware of different 
ways of interpreting the same scene. For example, Nausicaa’s wish to 
marry Odysseus could be taken as indicating wantonness and akolasia, 
if she merely saw a strange man and “had the same experience as 
Calypso”. But if, on the other hand, she is influenced by her admira-
tion for Odysseus’ character and conversation, she should be admired. 
Similarly, Odysseus’ pleasure at the gifts Penelope had persuaded the 
suitors to give her might be interpreted negatively (he rejoices in the 
profits of prostituting his wife) or positively (he thinks he will have 
them more in his power) (27A-C). As David Konstan puts it:
It is important to note that Plutarch does not insist that one inter-
pretation of Odysseus’ or Nausicaa’s behaviour is more correct that 
the other. He is perfectly happy to leave the moral valency of these 
episodes indeterminate. Plutarch is not concerned to educe the authen-
tic meaning of a text or the original intention of the poet. Poetry for 
him is rather an occasion for listeners to exercise and sharpen their 
54 Similarly the On the fortune of the Romans poses the question of whether 
Rome’s success should be owed to luck or virtue. It is possible that it was meant to 
be read alongside a (lost) On the virtue of the Romans or On the fortune or virtue of 
Alexander. See Swain (1989b), 504; Schröder (1991); Duff (1999), 300. 
55 I am indebted to Konstan (2004) for what follows. See also Duff (2004), 285-
86; Konstan (2006), 10-11.
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interpretive skills. To be sure, students are expected to evaluate each 
episode according to a set of high-minded ethical criteria, to which 
Plutarch himself no doubt subscribed. But the moral standard serves 
in practice as a stimulus to ingenuity . . . The way to make poetry safe 
is to create a sophisticated and questioning audience for it56.
Young readers, in other words, are to be trained not only to read with 
the kind of moral or judgemental attitude which we noted earlier, but 
also to interrogate the text itself. They should be taught to engage 
critically with the text, to question it, to resist it: “For”, as Plutarch 
puts it, “he who opposes and resists [ἀπαντῶν καὶ ἀντερείδων] and does 
not give himself up to every argument broadside as though to a gust 
of wind but thinks that it has rightly been said that ‘a fool tends to be 
aflutter at every argument’ will thrust aside much of what is not truly or 
profitably said” (28D)57. One tool for such interrogation is comparison: 
to better understand Achilles’ speech to Agamemnon, Plutarch says, 
one should compare it with Thersites’ and note the differences (28F-
29A); similarly one should note the differences between Calchas and 
Nestor, and the Trojans and the Greeks (29C-30C). Above all, readers 
should not read in a desultory fashion, or merely for amusement, but 
actively seek out what may benefit them and improve their character, 
as a bee seeks out flowers (30C-F).
This is exactly the sort of reader Plutarch expects in the Lives: 
engaged, reflective, critical. Such readers interrogate what they read, 
compare one Life with another Life, see historical figures in the round, 
question their actions and debate their moral valency. Such ideal read-
ers also abstract moral lessons for themselves from what they read 
and seek ways to apply such lessons in their own lives, rather than 
waiting to be told or expecting to be preached at. They are also alert 
to complexities, subtleties and contradictions, as well as to allusions 
and references to earlier literature. When faced with morally or intel-
lectually challenging material, they see this as an opportunity to flex 
their critical muscles. The How the young man should listen to poems 
ends with the claim that the young man needs to be taught to read 
poetry critically “in order that, having gained a preliminary education 
[προπαιδευθείς] . . . he may be conveyed by poetry to philosophy [ὑπὸ 
56 Konstan (2004), 20.
57 Konstan points out that Plutarch in this way pre-empts the modern critical 
emphasis on the role of the reader and ‘the death of the author’. As he puts it, 
“Accountability for the meaning or message of the text is thus shifted from the poet 
to the audience” (ibid. 8).
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ποιητικῆς ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν προπέμπηται]” (37B)58. In the Lives, Plutarch 
expects more mature readers who, by applying their critical faculties, 
are able to read history philosophically, that is, to see in the Lives of 
the great men of the past a stimulus to their own critical reflection59. 
As Plutarch once puts it in another context, they are to use “history 
as material for philosophy”60.
58 Cf. 15F: “Poems should not be avoided by those who intend to pursue philosophy, 
but they should use poems as an introductory exercise in philosophy [προφιλοσοφητέον 
τοῖς ποιήμασιν], as they become accustomed to seek the useful in the pleasurable and 
so be satisfied”.
59 Cf. Duff (2007/8), 14-15. Cf. also Stadter (2002b), 6: “There is every reason 
to think that Plutarch saw his political essays and especially his Parallel Lives as his 
attempt as philosopher to enter the cave of politics” (alluding to Plato, R. 519c-521b); 
Id. (1997), 78 on the Aristeides – Cato Major: “. . . the emphasis from the beginning of 
the pair has been a philosophical problem, but one worked out in the real world”.
60 The phrase is from De def. or. 410B and describes a certain Cleombrotus, who 
συνῆγεν ἱστορίαν οἷον ὕλην φιλοσοφίας θεολογίαν ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκάλει τέλος ἐχούσης. On this 
passage, see Flacelière (1974); Brenk (1977), 90-91. 
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Abstracts
1. Virtues for the people
L. Van der Stockt, Semper duo, numquam tres? Plutarch’s Popular-
philosophie on friendship and virtue in On Having Many Friends
De amicorum multitudine (On Having Many Friends) is a short text that starts ‘play-
fully’ with a witty anecdote, treats the practical problem of the role of friendship 
in daily life, and ends with a clear-cut summary of the communicated instruction. 
K. Ziegler classified Plutarch’s On Having Many Friends as ‘Popularphilosophie’ 
for good reasons.
The contribution at hand first sketches the goals and procedures of eighteenth-
century German ‘Popularphilosophie’, and then explores the interaction of philo-
sophical tenets with rhetorical invasiveness in this particular Plutarchan ‘lecture’. It 
makes it clear that Plutarch’s rhetorical techniques (as they are also discernible in 
his hypomnemata) as well as his partial representation of traditional philosophical 
tenets (especially Aristotle) create a positive and stimulating pedagogy. More than 
Themistius’ On Friendship (Or. 22), the lecture seems to address a youthful audi-
ence, appealing to its self-esteem; more than Maximus’ Friendship and Virtue (Or. 
35), it testifies to the confidence that the (idealized) friendship is within reach.
Chr. Pelling, What is popular about Plutarch’s ‘popular philosophy’?
This paper addresses two questions: what is popular philosophy, that is, does Plutarch 
conceive of it as different from other sorts of ethics, and, if so, whom is this phi-
losophy for? It approaches these issues obliquely through the Lives, and concentrates 
particularly on questions of politics. Some passages, especially the encounter of 
Solon and Croesus, suggest that there are particular occupational hazards which 
the rich and famous face; Plutarch’s adaptation of Herodotus there highlights a sort 
of wisdom that is ‘reasonable’ and ‘popular’ (metrios and demotikos). However, 
there is no idealisation of ‘simple things’, no suggestion that ordinary people have 
an instinctive understanding which their leaders may lack, and ‘popular wisdom’ 
certainly does not involve doing whatever the demos wants. The demos needs lead-
ership, in Solon-Publicola as, for instance, in Pericles, Nicias, and the Praecepta 
Rei Publicae Gerendae. So the ethics of leadership may be different from those 
of the people themselves; the people’s prejudices and lack of insight may have to 
be manipulated and exploited, and that may even mean that different behaviour is 
right for politicians in different cities. Where the demos is praised, as in its reaction 
to the disaster of Cannae in Fabius, it is for responding to the right lead. Proper 
paideia is necessary for such leadership, but the philosophical face occupational 
hazards too, and men like Dion, Cato, and Thales may lose contact with the need 
for compromise that lesser intellects may grasp; it may also be part of Plutarch’s 
own self-characterisation that he projects his ability to strike different notes at 
different times and in different works. Such ‘popular philosophy’ is certainly open 
to the good and great, who may be helped to avoid occupational hazards; but the 
Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics  -  ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4  -  Leuven University Press
378 abstracts
more regular target audience is probably, as so often in literature of this period, 
the elite pepaideumenos, who himself has to prepare to give the leadership that 
ordinary people require.
T.E. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives and the critical reader
This paper analyses the kind of reader constructed in the Lives and the response 
expected of that reader. It begins by attempting a typology of moralising in the Lives. 
Plutarch does sometimes make general ‘gnomic’ statements about right and wrong, 
and occasionally passes explicit judgement on a subject’s behaviour. In addition, 
the language with which Plutarch describes character is inherently moralistic; and 
even when he does not pass explicit judgement, Plutarch can rely on a common 
set of notions about what makes behaviour virtuous or vicious. 
The application of any moral lessons, however, is left to the reader’s own judge-
ment. Furthermore, Plutarch’s use of multiple focalisations means that the reader 
is sometimes presented with varying ways of looking at the same individual or 
the same historical situation. In addition, many incidents or anecdotes are marked 
by ‘multivalence’; that is, they resist reduction to a single moral message or les-
son. In such cases, the reader is encouraged to exercise his or her own critical 
faculties. Indeed, the prologues which precede many pairs of Lives and the syn-
kriseis which follow them sometimes explicitly invite the reader’s participation 
in the work of judging. The syncritic structure of the Parallel Lives also invites 
the reader’s participation, as do the varying perspectives provided by a corpus of 
overlapping Lives. 
In fact, the presence of a critical, engaged reader is presupposed by the agonistic 
nature of much of Greek literature, and of several texts in the Moralia which stage 
opposing viewpoints or arguments. Plutarch himself argues for such a reader in his 
How the Young Man Should Listen to Poems.
P. Desideri, Greek poleis and the Roman Empire: nature and features 
of political virtues in an autocratic system
This contribution aims at assessing the particular features which mark Plutarch’s 
idea of the perfect statesman: better said, of the perfect Greek statesman in a 
situation of autocratic external control of the city-state, i.e., in the context of the 
Roman imperial age in which Plutarch himself lived. Plutarch is well aware of the 
great differences which exist between contemporary and past conditions of politi-
cal life in Greece, and strongly recommends his readers not to forget them. The 
main point, as one can easily recollect from the author’s Praecepta rei publicae 
gerendae, is that there is no foreign political activity any longer to be carried 
out by the Greek poleis of present times; as a consequence, the politician’s job 
is confined just to finding the best way to ensure his community’s loyalty to the 
Roman Empire, guaranteeing its internal order and safety. This is not to say that 
this is an easy job. First of all, the modern Greek statesman cannot be allowed 
to emphasise, in order to strengthen the political feelings of his community, or, 
incidentally, to promote his own career, the great military accomplishments and 
virtues of the glorious Greek past; on the contrary, he will carefully stress episodes 
of friendly behaviour inside the polis and among different poleis: much less exciting 
models, indeed, to be proposed to the masses. In these conditions it is difficult to 
emerge suddenly as a great leader, and it is much safer to grow slowly, prefer-
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ably in the shadow of some successful politician of a former generation, which 
means, uncomfortably, to arrive at the most important political positions in old age. 
But apart from anything else, governing Greek poleis at that time implied steady 
confrontation with the symbols of the Roman central government in one’s region: 
that is, with the Roman governors who in fixed times followed one another in 
the single provinces of the Empire, supervising the correct working of the Roman 
administrative system therein. The problems which came out of this situation are 
keenly felt by Plutarch, as well as by other Greek political writers of the period 
(such as Dio). Plutarch strongly underlines that the Greek statesman must absolutely 
reaffirm his own and his polis’ dignity in any circumstance, but at the same time 
he is fully convinced that only concord among the well-to-do can really be a good 
solution for such problems.
J.C. Capriglione, Del satiro che voleva baciare il fuoco (o Come 
trarre vantaggio dai nemici)
Plutarch was himself thoroughly familiar with political praxis as well as with so 
many politicians whose experience he took into account when addressing various 
writings to them. The little pamphlet How to profit from one’s enemies explores and 
promotes the art of taking advantage of the wickedness and the malevolence of our 
enemies. Those enemies offer the best possible motive for leading an irreproachable 
life, a life guided by sophrosynè, that makes the other virtues instrumental. Indeed, 
Plutarch’s pragmatic advice is not only about our control over our own passions, 
but also about controlling our enemies, about making them silent and impotent. 
Plutarch’s advice is thus ethical and at the same time social: he has in mind an 
ethos that makes us moral subjects capable of assessing the margins of transgres-
sion in the varying circumstances, and of moving into the direction of what is best 
in a given situation. It is not so much an abstract Idea of the Good that inspires 
Plutarch’s advice, but an uncertain code that is always in fieri.
L. Van Hoof, Plutarch’s ‘Diet-ethics’. Precepts of Healthcare between 
diet and ethics
In antiquity, the question of what constitutes a healthy regimen was the object of 
a fierce debate among doctors, athletic trainers, and philosophers. When writing 
his Precepts of Healthcare (De tuenda sanitate praecepta), Plutarch’s authority was 
therefore far from self-evident. As the opening dialogue of the text makes clear, the 
author not only reveals himself to be acutely aware of this challenge, but also eager 
to take it up. This article examines the nature of Plutarch’s healthcare programme, 
and analyses some important strategies used in order to promote this ‘diet-ethical’ 
advice in dialogue with competing views on healthcare.
2. Some theoretical questions on ethical praxis
H.M. Martin, Plutarchan morality: arete, tyche, and non-consequen-
tialism
This essay begins with an examination of Demosthenes 12.7-13.6, where Plutarch 
extols Demosthenes for consistently advocating in his public policy the principle 
that Athens should do what is right (to kalon), regardless of the consequences. 
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This moral position is then contrasted with consequentialism, ‘the view that all 
actions are right or wrong in virtue of the value of their consequences’. Various 
passages in the Lives and the Moralia are successively analysed in order to present 
the Platonic essence of the morality extolled in the Demosthenes and to empha-
sise the non-consequentialism of such morality: Pericles 1-2, De Iside et Osiride 
351CD, De sollertia animalium 960A-965B, De facie 942F-945D, De sera numinis 
vindicta 550DE, Phocion 1.4-6, Dion 1.1-2. Special attention is paid to to kalon 
as the term and concept that stands at the heart of Plutarch’s moral thought and 
links it inextricably to Plato’s. The essay then shifts to an array of passages in the 
Lives in which Plutarch assumes a consequentialist position, in that he advocates 
or approves the notion that expediency (to sympheron) must have precedence over 
what is right (to dikaion) when the welfare of one’s country is at stake: Phocion 
32.1-9, Theseus-Romulus 6.1-5, Themistocles 3.5-4.4, Aristides 13.2 and 25.1-3, 
Cimon 2.5, Nicias-Crassus 4.3-4. Finally, this inconsistency in Plutarch’s moral 
thought is explained as the expression of something that is actually a common 
feature of human experience, and as a reflection of his unguarded reaction to the 
moral dilemmas he personally faced when he gazed into the mirror of history and 
evaluated the conduct of the subjects of the Lives.
J. Opsomer, Virtue, fortune, and happiness in theory and practice
This contribution explores the relations between (good and bad) luck, character, 
and happiness, primarily in the Life of Dion, but also in other works. In order to 
examine this issue, it is possible to make abstraction of theological and cosmologi-
cal issues, though they were important to Plutarch. The question whether virtue 
is conducive to, or even sufficient for, happiness was of great concern to ancient 
philosophers. As a Platonist, Plutarch is committed to the view that virtue, which 
consists in the rule of reason over the passions so that the latter are moderated 
(metriopatheia), is strongly conducive to happiness. He is even attracted by the 
view that virtue constitutes a sufficient condition to that end. Yet he distances 
himself from the view that luck plays no role at all towards happiness. In De 
virtute morali Plutarch takes into account the role of luck when he is discussing 
prudence, an intellectual virtue that is exercised in the realm of contingency. The 
relationship between virtue and luck is central to the Life of Dion. Upbringing and 
education, but also our individual innate nature, are a matter of constitutive moral 
luck. Dion had a good nature, grew up under adverse circumstances, and was lucky 
to meet Plato. Dionysius the Younger also met Plato, but, unfortunately for him, he 
did not have an equally good innate predisposition toward virtue. Once virtue is 
achieved, it is its own reward, although it does not guarantee worldly success. Even 
a rather virtuous person such as Dion has to worry about contingencies. Adversity 
is also a test for character. In the Life of Sertorius Plutarch comes close to the 
Stoic view that virtue cannot be lost due to ill-fortune. Yet he allows for less than 
perfect forms of virtue, which are not incorruptible. In the Life of Solon he claims 
that a virtuous disposition can be destroyed by drugs or disease. I argue there is 
no inconsistency between these claims. Plutarch accepts the existence and moral 
relevance of pure luck, for this is where practical virtues and prudence become 
relevant. He also accepts constitutive moral luck as a given.
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G. Roskam, Plutarch against Epicurus on affection for offspring. A 
reading of De amore prolis
This paper contains a full discussion of Plutarch’s De amore prolis (Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ 
ἔγγονα φιλοστοργίας), a fairly brief but problematic text about the natural character 
of love for one’s children. A correct understanding of Plutarch’s position presup-
poses a good insight in the previous philosophical tradition about the concept of 
φιλοστοργία in general, and particularly about the previous debate between Stoics 
and Epicureans on the issue of parental love for children. A concise survey of this 
rich tradition is then followed by a systematic interpretation of Plutarch’s argument 
in De amore prolis, which throws a new light on the argumentative, cumulative 
structure of the work and points to several interesting parallels from other Plutarchan 
works and from the works of other authors. This analysis also shows that the text 
should be understood as an anti-Epicurean polemic and that overemphasising the 
importance of the topic of animal psychology or family ethics risks misrepresenting 
the true scope of the work.
3. Virtues and vices
A.G. Nikolaidis, Plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics: some remarks on De gar-
rulitate, De curiositate, and De vitioso pudore
This paper discusses the manner with which Plutarch treats the minor foibles of 
ἀδολεσχία (garrulity), πολυπραγμοσύνη (indiscreet curiosity, meddlesomeness) and 
δυσωπία (excessive shyness, compliancy), which he regards as affections (pathē) 
or diseases (nosēmata) of the soul. The relevant essays comprise three distinct parts: 
definition and main features of the foible, examples illustrating the behaviour of the 
character concerned, and advice for therapy. Plutarch’s treatment of polypragmosynē 
and dysōpia makes it easy for one to understand why these foibles are described 
as affections and maladies of the soul, but for adoleschia this is not so clear and 
the reasons offered are hardly satisfactory or convincing. This paper attempts to 
give an explanation for this and proceeds to suggest some reasons. The worst 
of the three foibles is polypragmosynē, since it springs from a malicious nature, 
whereas dysōpia, irrespective of the disastrous consequences it often entails, is a 
blemish of good nature. In fact, what makes dysōpia an undesirable character trait 
is the element of excess it involves. As for adoleschia, its treatment is at the same 
time a eulogy of silence and reticence. Despite certain exaggerations, unfortunate 
comparisons, and far-fetched assertions, Plutarch’s treatises are well organized: his 
argumentation is clear and coherent, most of his observations judicious and on the 
mark, and some of his psychological insights perceptive and remarkable. Finally, 
the common denominator among the three essays is that the suggested therapy is 
effected with the aid of reason, which will not only help us to perceive both the 
cause and their catastrophic results of our failings, but will also dictate the proper 
measures (acquirement of certain habits and practices) by means of which we may 
minimize and ultimately get rid of them.
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H.G. Ingenkamp, Plutarchs Schrift gegen das Borgen (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν 
δανείζεσθαι): Adressaten, Lehrziele und Genos
Plutarch’s treatise forms a group with (at least) two other essays, De cupiditate 
divitiarum and De tranquillitate animi. The theoretical base of this section of 
Plutarch’s writings is De cup. div., ch. 3f. Plutarch says there that the person 
whom the essay is going to help needs an explanation why she or he is sick (and 
not a therapy via ἄσκησις that consists of meditation and practice). Plutarch, in this 
essay, is not a psychotherapist, but an educator. More specifically, (1) he writes for 
a group of cultured people. This may be inferred from some ‘springboard argu-
ments’. Springboard-arguments begin with a quotation, a metaphor, an anecdote, 
or a simple statement, only to lead the reader in a different direction afterwards. 
Springboards are lost on an audience that is too uneducated to discover the joke 
lying in the gap. This essay (2) teaches αὐτάρκεια or ἐλευθερία. According to the 
treatise, a person disposes of αὐτάρκεια or ἐλευθερία, if she or he is in the state of 
σχολή while being ready to live on what she or he already possesses (χρῆσθαι τοῖς 
παροῦσιν). It is this concept of σχολή that is remarkable here. Plutarch says, on the 
one hand, that in order to avoid the money lender’s harsh command ‘ἀποδός’, we 
should try to make friends with powerful (and rich) people. This, of course, is 
quite in tune with what the Greek upper class thought, whose σχολή had its base 
in prosperity. But, on the other hand, Plutarch also suggests earning one’s living 
as a teacher, or a paedagogus or a baker or a doorkeeper or a sailor or a sailing 
merchant’s clerk. Thus we may conclude that the notion of σχολή in Plutarch’s text 
can be taken as a purely mental attitude. His audience may have been educated, as 
has been said, and, at least partly, poor. It seems to resemble that of the sermons 
on the same subject of Basilius (who depends on Plutarch), Gregory of Nyssa (who 
depends on Basilius), and John Chrysostomus.
Ph.A. Stadter, Competition and its costs: φιλονικία in Plutarch’s soci-
ety and heroes
In his Moralia and Parallel Lives, Plutarch explores the positive and negative aspects 
of competitiveness, philonikia (literally, ‘love of victory’). After establishing that the 
correct form and derivation of the stem is from nik- (‘victory’), not neik- (‘strife’), 
this paper examines Plutarch’s use of words formed from the philonik- stem. Like 
classical authors, notably Plato and Aristotle, he recognizes both good and bad 
aspects of competition. Philonikia is a passion that can be directed positively or 
negatively. In the Moralia, on the one hand, Plutarch adopts a hortatory position, 
warning against the dangers of competitiveness within the family (On Brotherly 
Love), among friends (Table Talks), and in politics (Rules for Politicians, Old Men 
in Politics). In effect, the philonikia described is always undesirable. In the Parallel 
Lives, on the other hand, he recognizes that competition can on occasion spur a 
political figure to greatness, but can also be destructive, as is shown by an analysis 
of four pairs of Lives (Lycurgus-Numa, Agesilaus-Pompey, Aristides-Cato the Elder, 
Philopoemen-Flamininus). Lycurgus encouraged competitiveness among the Spartan 
youth, whereas Numa sought to soothe the Romans’ martial spirit. Agesilaus carried 
competitiveness too far, and Sparta suffered for it; likewise, Pompey’s insistence 
on being first led to Rome’s civil war and his own death. For both, philonikia 
was a passion they could not control. In the latter two pairs, philonikia shows a 
more positive aspect. Plutarch’s philosophy of civic harmony has no real place for 
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competition, but pragmatically he recognises its usefulness when directed towards 
what is just and profitable for the state, as in Aristides’ case. Therefore he regularly 
praises his protagonists’ self-control in managing their philonikia, and urges it for 
his contemporaries.
4. ‘Popular philosophy’ in context
A. Pérez Jiménez, Astrometeorología y creencias sobre los astros 
en Plutarco
This contribution shows that Plutarch, who was highly interested in contemporary 
religious and scientific issues, was familiar with certain popular beliefs about the 
stars. This concern is evident in the titles of some lost works, in some Table 
Talks of which only the titles remain, and in several passages of the Lives where 
Plutarch echoes the activity of the astrologers. In this contribution I pay attention 
to Plutarch’s beliefs on astral mysticism as they appear in De Iside, as well as to 
his interpretation of astrometeorological phenomena concerning the behaviour of 
animals and plants under the influence of the sun and moon. Sufficient information 
about this theme can be found in the above mentioned De Iside, in the Comment 
on Hesiod’s Works and Days, and in the Table Talks. A closer analysis also shows 
that Plutarch’s beliefs concerning this influence are in line with other literary testi-
monies of Imperial times and, in particular, with some prescriptions in astrological 
lunar calendars of late antiquity.
J. Mossman – F. Titchener, Bitch is not a four-letter word. Animal 
reason and human passion in Plutarch
It is no surprise to the authors that a humane, compassionate, tolerant, and wise human 
like Plutarch wrote several essays specifically about animals, notably Terrestriane an 
aquatilia animalia sint callidiora (De sollertia animalium), Bruta animalia ratione 
uti, and De esu carnium orationes ii. These essays were used by philosophers in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as early evidence of the so-called ‘theriophilic 
paradox, the notion that while the human being occupies a higher rung in the 
universal hierarchy than the beast, as indicated by human power over the animal 
world, human behaviour justifies the claim that human morality is on a lower level 
than that of the beasts’. In modern times, classical scholarship has tended to use 
these essays as ammunition for an animal rights movement, which of course can 
be seen as an extension of the Enlightenment interest in theriophily.
Yet although these ‘animal’ essays are grouped with Plutarch’s other ‘scientific’ 
essays in Loeb vol. xii (De facie, De primo frigido, Aquane an ignis sit utilior), our 
interest in Plutarch’s animals is not particularly scientific – rather, we are focusing 
on rhetoric. We hope that analysis of De sollertia animalium (and, to a lesser extent, 
Bruta animalia ratione uti) will provide insight into Plutarch’s own attitudes about 
virtues, arguing that the use of animals provides a kind of surrogacy or a place 
for Plutarch to argue his points at a safe remove. We also hope to show that there 
is more to these charming dialogues in terms of rhetorical skill and subtlety than 
may immediately be apparent, or has traditionally been assumed.
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F. Frazier, Autour du miroir. Les miroitements d’une image dans 
l’œuvre de Plutarque
This paper aims at an exhaustive reconsideration of the simile of the mirror in 
Plutarch’s works. Generally speaking, the comparison enables drawing nearer some-
thing that is far away (e.g., knowledge or virtue) and shows what deserves to be 
sought or imitated. More precisely, the vast range of uses of this ‘mirror’ may be 
classified under two headings, ontology (with its epistemological sequel) and ethics. 
In the epistemological field, the mirror imagery appears in relation to mathematics – 
especially geometry – and reminds us of the necessity for human knowledge to 
lean on sensible images that only reflect intelligible beings and may be deceptive 
as well as initiatory, as is shown by the ambiguous action of the sun. In the ethical 
field, Plutarch insists on self-knowledge and emulation of the glorious models of 
the past, but he also takes into account the demands of particular circumstances. 
In everyday life friends can contribute to moral improvement, but Plutarch does 
not use the simile of the mirror for them – as the Stoics, Seneca, or Epictetus do 
for the philosophers. Instead, only wives or flatterers are called ‘mirrors’, denoting 
either conjugal harmony or contemptible servility. The analysis finally raises the 
(still open) question of the respective roles which interiority and the example of 
other people have in moral life.
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